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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
During 1982-1983, state decisions in cases affecting local govern-
ments spanned the normal array of categories, including the state con-
stitution's bar on local laws,' the status of local governments vis a vis
the state,' Louisiana's annexation statutes,3 the rights and protections
afforded to public officers" and employees,' the scope of the police
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. City of New Orleans v. Treen, 431 So. 2d 390 (La. 1983); see infra notes 76-105
and accompanying text.
2. E.g., City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1983); New Orleans
Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 402 (La. 1982); Ruby v. City of
Shreveport, 427 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 154 (La. 1983);
Spillman v. City of Baton Rouge, 417 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), remanded,
430 So. 2d 92 (La. 1983) (reconsider in light of New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n); see infra
notes 106-78 and accompanying text; see also City of Baton Rouge v. De Frances, 429
So. 2d 470 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (state law governing qualifications for city judgeship
prevails over less restrictive qualifications established in home rule charter).
3. E.g., Kel-Kan Inv. Corp. v. Village of Greenwood, 428 So. 2d 401 (La. 1983) (an-
nexation statute does not authorize judicial review of a municipality's failure to act favorably
on a deannexation petition filed by property owners whose property is located in the
municipality); Bernelle v. Town of Richwood, 420 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982)
(30-day prescription statute applicable to suits challenging annexation ordinances does not
apply to a suit where the municipality failed to prove that the ordinance was published
as required by the statute to begin the running of the prescriptive period).
4. E.g., Detraz v. Fontana, 416 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1982) (LA. R.S. 42:261(E), which
grants public officials who are sued for matters arising out of the duties of their office
the rights to collect attorney fees if the suit is unsuccessful and to require that bond to
cover attorney fees be posted before the case is tried, is unconstitutional because it denies
potential plaintiffs equal protection, due process, and access to the courts); Lowry v. City
of Oakdale, 429 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (coroner's certification of his expenses
as "necessary and unavoidable" when he testified under oath at trial was sufficient to re-
quire city to pay expenses that the court found were reasonable and necessary for the func-
tioning of the parish coroner).
5. E.g., City of Kenner v. Pritchett, 432 So. 2d 971 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (city
had authority to discharge a police officer for single incident of sleeping on duty even though
officer had five years of prior satisfactory service, and no permanent officer had previously
been terminated for a single sleeping incident); Mixon v. New Orleans Parish Police Dep't,
430 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (probationary employee bears burden of proof
in age discrimination appeal to city civil service commission); Ivy v. Natchitoches Parish
School Bd., 428 So. 2d 1332 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 180 (La.. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 279 (1983) (single vehicular accident could form the basis for dismissal
of a tenured school bus driver); Dauser v. Department of Pub. Utils., 428 So. 2d 1176
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (evidence that department had few or no women supervisors does
not constitute proof of discrimination); Linton v. Bossier City Mun. Fire & Police Civil
Serv. Bd., 428 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (discharge authority may consider an
employee's entire work record in determining his fitness for continued employment so long
as charges are not so stale as to impugn the good faith of the appointing authority); Sam-
pite v. Natchitoches Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 426 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983)
(judicial review of a civil service board's refusal to recuse a member is limited to the statutory
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power,6 local option elections,7 land use controls,' public contracts, 9 tort
standard of whether the decision "was made in good faith for cause"); Daniel v. Depart-
ment of Police, 426 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (police officer's failure to comply
with ordinance requiring all city employees to live within city limits did not amount to
"good cause" for his dismissal from the police force); George v.'Town of Lutcher, 422
So. 2d 537 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982) (Lawrason Act permits the mayor and board of aldermen
of a municipality to terminate municipal employees for reasons other than the two grounds-
misconduct and neglect of duties-for which the statute specifically authorizes dismissal);
Tanner v. City of Baton Rouge, 422 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied,
429 So. 2d 128 (La. 1983) (action in discharging a plumbing inspector for encouraging sub-
division residents to resist city sewer tie-ins and to seek legal assistance did not violate the
first amendment rights of the inspector); Bellard v. Department of Streets, 421 So. 2d 258
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1983) (by vesting general rule-
making authority in civil service commissions, article X, section 10(A)(1) of the Louisiana
Constitution supersedes the statutory requirement that a probationary employee be notified
of her dismissal at least ten days prior to the expiration of the probationary period).
6. Hutchinson v. Board of Aldermen, 423 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982) (city
ordinance that prohibited issuance of licenses to sell fireworks to anyone except existing
retailers was a valid exercise of the city's police power that did not violate the equal protec-
tion or due process rights of unsuccessful applicants for a license); Metropolitan New Orleans
Chapter v. Council of New Orleans, 423 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied,
430 So. 2d 77 (La. 1983) (city does not have to hold hearings before approving monthly
fuel adjustment charges of public utilities).
7. E.g., Rapides Merchants Assoc. v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 421 So. 2d 955
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 426 So. 2d 174 (La. 1983) (Act 663 of 1980 allows
local governing bodies to ban beverages containing less than 3.20o alcohol by volume); Gruner
v. Claiborne Parish Police Jury, 417 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 420 So.
2d 456 (La. 1982) (in determining whether a local option election satisfies the statute's re-
quirement that it be conducted in substantial compliance with statutory requirements, courts
will use the election code's general tests for judicial challenges to elections).
8. Morton v. Jefferson Parish Council, 419 So. 2d 431 (La. 1982) (language allowing
a special use zoning district so long as it did "not seriously affect any adjoining property
or the general welfare" provided inadequate standards to justify parish's denial of the special
use permit requested by the plaintiff); Calcasieu Parish Police Jury v. Boullion, 432 So.
2d 1181 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (where state health regulations were amended to require
seafood processor to use an extra room, addition of a room to a seafood processing establish-
ment did not constitute an impermissible enlargement of a nonconforming use); Hays v.
City of Baton Rouge, 421 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1166
(La. 1982) (state law that governs location of "community homes" for retarded adults only
applies to homes that provide resident services and supervision to fewer than six handicap-
ped persons and does not supercede local ordinance insofar as it applies to a home designed
to accommodate seven retarded adults); Terrytown Properties v. Parish of Jefferson, 416
So. 2d 323 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982) (in refusing to rezone property from residential to
commercial use, city may properly rely on the substantial opposition from the residents
of the area as one basis for its decision); Wes-T-Erre Dev. Corp. v. Parish of Terrebonne,
416 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 421 So. 2d 251 (La. 1982) (police jury
may exercise its police power to preclude a particular landowner from opening driveway
without passing any general ordinance concerning driveways).
9. Louisiana Consumer's League v. City of Baton Rouge, 431 So. 2d 35 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1983) (even though mayor lacked authority to contract with consumer's league,
city council ratified the contract by not repudiating it immediately upon learning of its ex-
istence); City of Covington v. Heard, 428 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (if contrac-
tor complies with the plans and specifications supplied by the city, he is not liable for any
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liability,"' and the Open Meetings Law." In the same period, the United
States Supreme Court issued an important opinion'2 explaining the
market participant exception to the limitations imposed on local govern-
ments by the Commerce Clause,' 3 and various decisions of the federal
courts of appeals"' explored the impact of the recent Supreme Court
decisions that have denied antitrust immunity to local governments.',
In an effort to accommodate the conflicting needs for breadth of
coverage and depth of analysis, the present article will examine the
federal developments as well as two groups of state decisions: those
concerning the state's ability to control local governments and those
dealing with the problem of imposing tort liability on local governments.
deficiency in the plans or in the materials that the plans allow to be used); cf. Bilongo
v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 428 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(public bid law allows the state to contract with bidders whose bids contain "insubstantial"
deviations from the bid proposals and grants the state wide discretion in determining whether
the bid substantially varies from the proposal); Millette Enterprises v. State, 417 So. 2d
6 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 417 So. 2d 363 (La. 1982) (public bid law prohibits
contracting authority from rejecting all bids and rewriting specifications to prefer a par-
ticular bidder).
10. E.g., Jones v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 430 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983);
Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 430 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Brown v. Merz,
429 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Ciko v, City of New Orleans, 427 So. 2d 80
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426 So. 2d 720
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Brodnax v. Cappel, 425 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982);
Allen v. Housing Authority, 423 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 430
So. 2d 74 (La. 1983); Deville v. Calcasieu Parish Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 5, 422 So.
2d 631 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Patin v. Industrial Enterprises, 421 So. 2d 362 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1982); Cloud v. State, 420 So. 2d 1259 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 423 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (La. 1982); Booth v. Potashnick Constr.
Co., 420 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1183 (La. 1982); Williams
v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 417 So. 2d 483 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 420 So.
2d 980 (La. 1982); see infra notes 179-243 and accompanying text.
11. Eastwold v. Garsaud, 427 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (civil service commis-
sion's need to reach a decision by the end of the calendar year constituted an "extraor-
dinary emergency" that authorized the commission to dispense with the normal notice pro-
visions for a meeting scheduled to be held on December 29).
12. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983);
see infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text.
13. "Congress shall have Power ... [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ..... U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
8, cl. 3.
14. E.g., Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005
(8th Cir. 1983); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983); Omega
Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Westborough
Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1983); Pueblo Aircraft Serv.
v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982); Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of
Mason, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982); see infra notes 42-75 and accompanying text.
15. Community Communications Co. v, City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); see generally Murchison,
Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Local Government Law, 43 LA. L. REV. 461, 463-68
(1982).
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FEDERAL-LoCAL RELATIONS
Dormant Commerce Clause
For more than a century, the United States Supreme Court has adhered
to the position that, by granting the power to regulate interstate com-
merce to Congress, the Constitution operates to displace state and local
power in some situations where Congress has not exercised its power by
passing federal legislation.' 6 The precise boundaries of this dormant Com-
merce Clause limitation on local power have varied over the years,' and
two conflicting trends have appeared in recent decisions. On the one hand,
the Court has been noticeably more willing to strike down regulations
with significant impacts on interstate commerce,' 8 especially when a
disproportionate share of the burdens imposed by the regulation fall on
interstate commerce.' 9 At the same time, the Court has allowed states
to subsidize businesses owned by their own citizens20 and to grant their
own citizens preferential treatment from state-owned businesses2' when
the states act as "market participants" rather than as "market
regulators.""
During the 1982 term, the Court confirmed and expanded the latter
of these trends by explicitly including local governments within the ambit
of the "market participant" exemption and by allowing the governmen-
tal entity to use its market power to control contractual relationships
beyond the one to which it is a party. More specifically, White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers23 allowed the mayor
16. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); see also Mayor
v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
17. Compare Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) with Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); compare Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S.
520 (1959) with South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);
compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.,
393 U.S. 129 (1968) with Southern Pac. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
18. E.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Raymond
Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). The Court has continued to uphold non-
discriminatory regulations so long as the "incidental" burdens they impose on interstate
commerce are not "clearly excessive" in light of the state interests promoted by the regula-
tions. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982); New England Power Co.
v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 322 (1979); City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
20. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
21. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
22. Id. at 436.
23. 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983). Justice Blackmun dissented from the dormant Commerce
Clause holding and submitted a dissenting opinion that Justice White joined. He argued:
The legitimacy of a claim to the market participant exemption . . . should turn
primarily on whether a particular state action more closely resembles an attempt
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of Boston to require that bona fide residents of the city comprise at least
one half of the work force for all construction projects financed with
city funds."'
The opponents of the mayor's hire-Boston order argued that the reach
of the market participant exception should be established by using a balanc-
ing test essentially similar to the one used to determine whether local
regulations have an unreasonable impact on interstate commerce, i.e.,
balancing the burden on interstate commerce against the need for the local
action to achieve a valid objective." The Supreme Court emphatically re-
jected that approach, however. Instead, the Court described the "market
participant/market regulator" question as a preliminary issue that precedes
the balancing test used by the recent cases applying the dormant Com-
merce Clause; if the local government acts as a market participant, the
Commerce Clause is irrelevant. According to the White majority, the earlier
decisions in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.26 and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake27
established "the proposition that when a state or local government enters
the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Com-
merce Clause." 8
Having thus defined the issue, the Court proceeded to the conclusion
that the hire-Boston order fell within the market participant exception
without developing any clear test for separating market participation from
market regulation. By carefully distinguishing the Alaska-hire statute that
Hicklin v. Orbeck29 ruled violative of the Privileges and Immunities
to impede trade among private parties, or an attempt, analogous to the accustomed
right of merchants in the private sector, to govern the State's own economic con-
duct and to determine the parties with whom it will deal.
Id. at 1050. When judged by this standard, the mayor's order amounted, in Justice Blackmun's
view, to regulation rather than market participation because it was "a direct attempt to
govern private economic relationships" rather than an instance "of a seller's or purchaser's
simply choosing its bargaining partners." Id.
24. The order also applied to construction projects funded by federal grants that the
city administered. The Court unanimously upheld the order insofar as it applied to the
federally funded project on the ground that "the federal regulations for each program af-
firmatively permit[ted] the type of parochial favoritism expressed in the order." Id. at 1047
(footnote omitted); accord id. at 1048-49 (Blackmun, White, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (evaluation
of a state safety regulation challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause requires "a
weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate
commerce"); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("the extent of the
burden [on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature
of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities").
26. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
27. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
28. 103 S. Ct. at 1044.
29. 437 U.S. 518 (1978), noted in Note, Domicile Preferences in Employment: The
Case of Alaska Hire, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1069; 92 HARV. L. REv. 75 (1978).
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Clause,3" the Court did suggest, however, that the government's use of
its market power could amount to market regulation in extreme cases.
The Alaska statute invalidated in Hicklin required preference for Alaska
residents "in all work connected with oil and gas leases to which the State
was a party;" 3 by contrast, the application of the hire-Boston order in
White did not "represent the sort of 'attempt to force virtually all
businesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect'"
of the city's decision to enter into contracts for construction projects "to
bias their employment practices in favor of the [city's] residents." 32 Un-
fortunately, the opinion made no attempt to explain when market action
less pervasive than the one invalidated in Hicklin might make the govern-
ment's action one of market regulation rather than market participation.
A footnote acknowledged that some limits circumscribed a "local govern-
ment's ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate par-
ties with which the government transacts business." 3 But the Court found
no need in White "to define those limits with precision, except to say
that we think the Commerce Clause does not require the city to stop at
the boundary of formal privity of contract.""' Emphasizing that the
mayor's hire-Boston order "cover[ed] a discrete, identifiable class of
economic activity in which the city is a major participant,"" the major-
ity declared that it fell "well within the scope of Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves." 36
From a formal perspective, White makes analysis of Commerce Clause
problems more rational by defining the steps of the analytic process. It
unequivocally established a two-part test for analyzing dormant Commerce
Clause challenges to the actions of local governments. One first deter-
mines if the government is acting as a market participant or a market
regulator. If, as in White, the governmental action is classified as that
of a market participant, the Commerce Clause becomes irrelevant, and
no further analysis is needed. If, on the other hand, the government is
acting as a regulator, one must then proceed to the traditional question
involved in dormant Commerce Clause cases: whether the regulation im-
poses an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
By identifying market participation as a distinct, preliminary issue,
the Court has provided a method for approaching dormant Commerce
30. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. In White, the Court unani-
mously remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts without con-
sidering whether the mayor's order violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 103 S.
Ct. at 1048 n.12; id. at 1049 n.1 (Blackmun, White, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1046.
32. Id. (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978)).
33. Id. at 1046 n.7.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Clause cases which lessens the possibility of confusing the participa-
tion/regulation distinction with the traditional reasonableness test.
Nonetheless, the Court's failure to articulate a definite content for the
participation/regulation distinction leaves a conceptual void with a signifi-
cant number of practical implications. Because the economic impact of
government subsidies and preferences seems identical to that of govern-
ment regulation,37 the justification for the distinction must lie in certain
noneconomic values. Unfortunately, the White opinion and its predecessors
have done little to identify what those noneconomic values might be."
Until the Court clarifies the bases of the market participant exception,
application of the participation/regulation distinction must remain largely
a matter of guesswork.
One can anticipate that the Court will have the opportunity to ar-
ticulate and to refine the White distinction in the coming years. Local
governments can frequently exercise a significant degree of control over
private transactions if they have, or can obtain, dominant positions in
local markets, and intuition suggests that they will sometimes use their
power to prefer local citizens. For example, governments that own signifi-
cant quantities of natural resources may try to use their market power
to ensure that their citizens have an adequate quantity of the products
that are ultimately produced from those resources,39 or governments that
desire to avoid the importation of environmental problems may control
those problems through market participation and subsidies rather than
through regulation or prohibition." One suspects, and Justice Rehnquist's
37. But see Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-
Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 89-90 (1980) (the "primary redistributional effects"
of proprietary activities fall on the state's own citizens, who are the "true individual owners"
of resources that the state owns).
38. Reeves suggested two justifications for the market participant exception: "considera-
tions of state sovereignty," 447 U.S. at 438, and an analogy to " 'the long-recognized right
of trader or manufacturer . . . freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to par-
ties with whom he will deal.' " Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). Neither rationale is persuasive for explaining the scope of the
exception that White recognizes. Although the Court has recently recognized state sovereignty
as a constitutional value that merits judicial protection, the market participant exception
turns the concept on its head. Decisions such as National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), and United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982),
emphasize that state sovereignty protects states from congressional control only when they
are exercising "traditional governmental functions." By contrast, the market participant
exception protects states when they are acting in their proprietary role, but not when they
exercise governmental or regulatory powers. As for the second justification-the analogy
to the rights of private traders-the White dissent demonstrates that the authority the ma-
jority confers on local governments goes beyond "the right of traders in our free enterprise
system" to choose with whom they will deal. 103 S. Ct. at 1050 & n.4.
39. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 37, at 93-95 (discussing Louisiana and Texas
statutes); cf. La. S. 529, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983) (requiring state mineral leases to obligate
lessees to give preference and priority to Louisiana suppliers and labor in drilling, develop-
ment, and operational activity).
40. For example, a local government might try to circumvent City of Philadelphia v.
1983]
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dicta hints, that the Supreme Court will limit the ability of local govern-
ments to use the market participation exception to exercise control over
interstate commerce."' What remains impossible after White is confident
prediction of the point where the line will be drawn.
Antitrust Liability
This section of last year's faculty symposium42 analyzed the Supreme
Court's decision in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,43
which held that the "state action" doctrine did not preclude a "home
rule" municipality in Colorado from antitrust liability for adopting an
ordinance that imposed a moratorium on the expansion of cable televi -
sion services within its borders. That analysis criticized the Supreme Court's
decision, but it also noted that the ultimate impact of the decision would
depend upon the manner in which future cases applied traditional anti-
trust doctrine to cases involving local governments.4 4 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet issued any opinions applying Community Com-
munications, a number of lower courts have rendered decisions clarifying
the potential antitrust liability of local governments. In general, these deci-
sions have limited the impact of Community Communications in two
ways-by showing a willingness to find the state authorization necessary
to bring local governments within the ambit of the "state action" doc-
trine and by applying various nonimmunity defenses that are available
under the antitrust laws.
Community Communications indicated that local governments were
entitled to the state action immunity from antitrust liability "to the ex-
tent that they acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy,"" 5 and the recent decisions46 of the courts of ap-
peals have tried to explain what types of state statutes will satisfy this
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), by obtaining a monopoly over waste (or hazardous waste)
disposal facilities and then allowing only state residents to use those facilities.
41. See 103 S. Ct. at 1046 n.7 ("We agree with [the dissent] that there are some limits
on a state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the im-
mediate parties with which the government transacts business .... [But, we] find it un-
necessary in this case to define those limits with precision . . . ."); see also Anson & Schenk-
kan, supra note 37, at 89-91 (arguing that Congress should limit a state's ability to impose
contractual conditions on sales of natural resources when the conditions extend beyond the
immediate transaction in which the state is involved). Dicta in Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 448 (1980), suggests that the market participant exception may be inapplicable to sales
of natural resources. In addition, the Court may also limit the market participant exception
when a government uses its regulatory power to grant monopoly status to its own pro-
prietary activity.
42. Murchison, supra note 15, at 463-68.
43. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
44. Murchison, supra note 15, at 467.
45. 455 U.S. at 52.
46. See Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th
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requirement. Perhaps the most thorough of these attempts is Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.4 7 In this case, Judge Wisdom rejected three
possible obstacles to a finding that a state policy was sufficiently clear
and affirmative to immunize local governments from antitrust liability.
First, he refused to require that the state specifically authorize "the
monopolizing effect" that results from the local government's action; in-
stead, he was willing to infer state approval of any "anticompetitive ef-
fect that is a reasonable or foreseeable consequence ' 48 of engaging in an
activity that the state has authorized. Second, Judge Wisdom rejected an
argument that local governments be required to "point to a state policy
directing or compelling the challenged conduct ' 4 9 in order to claim the
state action immunity. Any local action taken "pursuant to clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed state policy . . . to displace com-
petition with regulation-whether compelled, directed, authorized, or in
the form of a prohibition" 5 -entitled a local government to antitrust im-
munity "because conduct pursuant to such a policy [constitutes] state
action."" Finally, he also declined to mandate "active state supervision"
of a local government's conduct as a prerequisite to state action immuni-
ty; such a requirement would, he declared, amount to an unwise erosion
of "the concept of local autonomy and home rule authority. 52
After these obstacles to state action immunity had been rejected, the
court in Town of Hallie went on to analyze the Wisconsin statutes govern-
ing sewerage collection and treatment. It found them sufficiently precise
to immunize the city from antitrust claims based upon a refusal to pro-
vide sewerage treatment facilities to areas in surrounding townships that
would not agree to be annexed into the city. 53
Other decisions have reached comparable conclusions with respect to
various state statutes. For example, another panel of the Seventh Circuit
held the Indianapolis city ordinances governing cable television licenses
and franchises sufficiently related to the state policy involved to support
the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction based upon state ac-
Cir. 1983); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 19'83); Omega
Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Westborough
Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2122 (1983); Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982);
Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
47. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wisdom, Sr. Cir. J., sitting by designation).
48. Id. at 381; accord Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705
F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
49. 700 F.2d at 381.
50. Id.
51. Id.; accord Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d
1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
52. 700 F.2d at 384; accord Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City,
705 F.2d 1005, 1015 (8th Cir. 1983).
53. 700 F.2d at 382-83.
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tion immunity."' Similarly, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Colorado
statutes authorizing cities to operate airports clothed them with state ac-
tion immunity for claims based on the anticompetitive nature of airport
leases."
The opinions of the last year have also begun to explore how other
doctrines of antitrust law will apply in cases involving local governments, 6
and the preliminary results suggest that substantive defenses will prove
significant in cases where immunity doctrine fails to bar the action. Mason
City Center Associates v. City of Mason City," one of the first decisions
handed down after Community Communications, emphasized the plain-
tiff's duty to prove the existence of a causal relationship between an
allegedly anticompetitive agreement and the injury that he suffered. In
addition, in affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction, Omega
Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis"' suggested that the "rule
of reason" would provide the substantive standard for evaluating antitrust
claims against local governments. Furthermore, dicta in an Eighth Circuit
opinion59 states that the Noerr/Pennington exception for lobbying
activities 60 will provide a defense to some claims.6' Although none of these
decisions can be regarded as the final word on the doctrines they discuss,
they do suggest that even when local governments cannot claim state ac-
tion immunity they will often be able to avoid antitrust liability.
Because three of the recent decisions involving local governments arose
in a single circuit, the Eighth Circuit, examination of these decisions as
a group provides a useful overview of the present potential for antitrust
liability. The most recent decision, Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer
v. City of Kansas City,62 confirmed that the state action immunity doc-
trine remains an important defense for local governments. It affirmed the
dismissal of an action charging that Kansas City's decision to license a
single ambulance company to serve the city63 violated the Sherman Act.6"
54. Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
55. Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
56. See generally Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: Litiga-
tion Strategies, 32 CAT. U.L. REv. 395 (1983) (discussing potential defenses available to
municipalities).
57. 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment based on jury verdict).
58. 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
59. Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1983).
60. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
61. The Eighth Circuit held the Noerr/Pennington exception inapplicable to the specific
facts before it. Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 745-46
(8th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
62. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
63. For a description of the city's system for providing ambulance service, see id. at
1008-10.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
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Since Missouri statutes" authorized the state's municipalities to use "single-
operation ambulance system[s]" and the legislature had enacted the statutes
with the "intent to displace competition, '6 -6 the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the state action defense exempted the city from Sherman Act liability.6 '
Moreover, the court's earlier decision in Mason City Center Associates
v. City of Mason City6' emphasized that, even in situations where the
city is not entitled to state action immunity, ' 9 proof that a local govern-
ment had entered into an anticompetitive agreement would not result in
antitrust liability without proof that the anticompetitive agreement had
caused the activity that harmed the plaintiff. Thus, the Eighth Circuit
in Mason City upheld a jury verdict for the city on the ground that the
evidence permitted a jury finding that the plaintiff had not proved the
causal relationship between the city's agreement with plaintiff's competitor
and the zoning decision that plaintiff challenged.7" However, the third
Eighth Circuit decision, Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape
Girardeau,' suggests that antitrust liability remains a significant threat
in extreme situations. Reversing the summary judgment granted by the
district court, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had offered
sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between the city and rival developers
to create a material issue of fact and thus to require a trial on the merits.
Proof of the allegations of misconduct would, the court declared, negate
the state action immunity: "[e]ven if zoning in general can be characterized
as 'state action,' . . . a conspiracy to thwart normal zoning procedures
. . . is not in furtherance of any clearly articulated state policy."7 "
Likewise, the Noerr/Pennington exemption for lobbying activities could
not bar the action without a trial because the exemption protected only
"legitimate lobbying efforts," not lobbying activities that were "accom-
panied by illegal or fraudulent actions." 73
Considered together, the Eighth Circuit decisions provide a useful
snapshot of the exposure to antitrust liability that local governments cur-
65. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 67.300, 190.100-.195 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1983); see gener-
ally 705 F.2d at 1011-12, 1011 n.9, 1012 n.10.
66. 705 F.2d at 1011.
67. Id. at 1015.
68. 671 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1982).
69. Mason City involved a challenge to the city's refusal to rezone property owned
by one of the plaintiffs to permit the construction of a shopping center. The Court's only
consideration of the state-action defense came in a footnote that noted the issue "would
be governed by [Community Communications]" and that declared the district had "accurately
predicted the future course of the law" when it rejected the defense. Id. at 1150 n.5.
70. Id. at 1149.
71. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 746. The court did, however, hold that the individual city defendants were
immune from personal liability under the Sherman Act. Id. at 748 n.9 (citing Gorman Towers,
Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1980)).
73. Id. at 746.
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rently face, and they provide no support for predictions that Community
Communications will have a catastrophic impact. Basically, they suggest
that the federal courts are ready to read state statutes sympathetically to
find state authorization for the anticompetitive consequences that inevitably
flow from local regulatory activity. The federal courts are willing to do
this in order to give local governments the protection of other defenses
that are generally available to antitrust defendants; they are willing to
impose liability only in egregious situations where local governments have
engaged in action far beyond the scope of conduct normally appropriate
to implement regulatory policies. Nonetheless, as last year's symposium
suggested," even this limited exposure strengthens the hands of developers
and others seeking to avoid the effect of local regulation. For one thing,
the mere threat of expensive antitrust litigation will induce many local
governments to choose compromise over conflict. In addition, the uncer-
tainty inherent in the lack of Supreme Court precedent explaining how
the major antitrust doctrines will apply to actions against local govern-
ments cautions local governments to minimize their exposure through com-
promise. Decisions of the next few years may significantly reduce this
latter pressure for compromise, but the former will remain unless Con-
gress chooses to amend the Sherman Act to overrule Community
Communications.5
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS
During the 1982-1983 term, Louisiana's appellate courts rendered a
number of significant decisions defining the scope of state authority over
local governments. Although one of these decisions continued the recent
trend toward limiting state authority to enact legislation directed at specific
local areas, the others recognized a relatively broad state power to con-
trol local governments when the state regulations take a more general form.
Local Laws
One of the ways that the Louisiana Constitution limits state involve-
ment in local affairs is by restricting the legislature's authority to pass
local laws. Article III, section 12(A) lists ten matters that the legislature
may not regulate by local act, 6 and article VI, section 2 forbids most
74. See Murchison, supra note 15, at 467-68.
75. The prospects for a legislative solution in the near future are not very bright. See
generally Williamson, Commentary: The Reagan Administration's Position on Antitrust
Liability of Municipalities, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 371 (1983); Civiletti, The Fallout from Com-
munity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospects for a Legislative Solution, 32
CATH. U.L. REV. 379 (1983).
76. Article Ill, section 12(A) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the legislature shall not pass
a local or special law:
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local acts dealing with incorporation, merger, or dissolution of
municipalities. 7 The constitution permits the legislature to enact local laws
(1) For the holding and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the place
of voting.
(2) Changing the names of persons; authorizing the adoption or legitimation
of children or the emancipation of minors; affecting the estates of minors or per-
sons under disabilities; granting divorces; changing the law of descent or succes-
sion; giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds or to any illegal disposi-
tion of property.
(3) Concerning any civil or criminal actions, including chahging the venue in
civil or criminal cases, or regulating the practice or jurisdiction of any court,
or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before
courts, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts or the en-
forcement of judgments, or prescribing the effects of judicial sales.
(4) Authorizing the laying out, opening, closing, altering, or maintaining of
roads, highways, streets, or alleys; relating to ferries and bridges, or incorporating
bridge or ferry companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams
which form boundaries between this and any other state; authorizing the con-
structing of street passenger railroads in any incorporated town or city.
(5) Exempting property from taxation; extending the time for the assessment
or collection of taxes; relieving an assessor or collector of taxes from the perform-
ance of his official duties or of his sureties from liability; remitting fines, penalties,
and forfeitures; refunding moneys legally paid into the treasury.
(6) Regulating labor, trade, manufacturing, or agriculture; fixing the rate of
interest.
(7) Creating private corporations, or amending, renewing, extending, or explaining
the charters thereof; granting to any private corporation, association, or individual
any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.
(8) Regulating the management of parish or city public schools, the building
or repairing of parish or city schoolhouses, and the raising of money for such
purposes.
(9) Legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer, employee, or
agent of the state, its agencies, or political subdivisions.
(10) Defining any crime.
Subsection B of section 12 forbids the legislature from indirectly enacting local or special
laws "by the partial repeal or suspension of a general law."
77. Article VI, section 2 provides:
The legislature shall provide by general law for the incorporation, consolida-
tion, merger, and government of municipalities. No local or special law shall create
a municipal corporation or amend, modify, or repeal a municipal charter. However,
a special legislative charter existing on the effective date of this constitution may
be amended, modified, or repealed by local or special law.
Article VI, section 44 defines the term general law as used in that article to mean "a
law of statewide concern enacted by the legislature which is uniformly applicable to all
persons or to all political subdivisions in the state or which is uniformly applicable to all
persons or to all political subdivisions within the same class." The judicial definitions of
the term general law, which have come in cases applying the restrictions now found in
article III, have not included the requirement that the law be one "of statewide concern."
See, e.g., State v. Slay, 370 So. 2d 508, 510 (La. 1979); State v. LaBauve, 359 So. 2d
181, 182 (La. 1978). But see City of New Orleans v. Treen, 431 So. 2d 390, 396 (La. 1983)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (Act 352 of 1982 is a general law because "the subject of the act
in question is a matter of legitimate state concern rightfully amenable to regulation by the
state within its police power").
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with respect to other matters,78 but only if the sponsor of the legislation
complies with the publication requirements of article III, section B."
The preliminary issue that determines if these constitutional provi-
sions are applicable is whether the statute under attack is a local act or
a general law. In deciding that issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
emphasized that a general law need not apply to every local government
within the state; it may confine its coverage to a class or subset of local
governments so long as the law applies to all members of the class and
the method of classification the law uses is reasonable. 0 Indeed, the court
has repeatedly recognized that even a statute that applies to a single locality
can be a general law if a reasonable classification would exclude all other
localities; 8' recent decisions, however, have declared that any law which
applies only in specifically named localities is "suspect as a local law." 82
The decision in City of New Orleans v. Treen" followed the approach
of these more recent cases by invalidating a statute that restructured the
Audubon Park Commission and required the city of New Orleans to ap-
propriate a fixed sum for the use of the new commission. 4 The city had
challenged the law, arguing that it was an invalid local law because it
was not publicized in accordance with the requirements of article III, sec-
tion 13. The supreme court agreed and ruled the statute unconstitutional.
78. The local government article expressly authorizes the legislature to "classify parishes
or municipalities according to population or on any other reasonable basis related to the
purpose of the classification" and to limit the effect of legislation "to any of such class
or classes." LA. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
79. Article Ill, section 13 provides:
No local or special law shall be enacted unless notice of the intent to introduce
a bill to enact such a law has been published on two separate days, without cost
to the state, in the official journal of the locality where the matter to be affected
is situated. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days prior to in-
troduction of the bill. The notice shall state the substance of the contemplated
law, and every such bill shall recite that notice has been given.
80. E.g., State v. Slay, 370 So. 2d 508, 510 (La. 1979); State v. LaBauve, 359 So.
2d 181, 182 (La. 1978); Davenport v. Hardy, 349 So. 2d 858, 863-64 (La. 1977); see generally
Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local
Government Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 681, 683-87 (1980); Murchison, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Local Government Law, 39 LA. L. REV.
843, 845-50 (1979).
81. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 80.
82. See, e.g., State v. Slay, 370 So. 2d 508, 511 (1979); State v. LaBauve, 359 So.
2d 181, 183 (La. 1978); cf. State ex rel. State Banking Dep't v. Acadiana Bank & Trust
Co., 360 So. 2d 846, 847 (La. 1978).
83. 431 So. 2d 390 (La. 1983).
84. 1982 La. Acts, No. 352, §§ 2-3.
85. Justice Dennis dissented. 431 So. 2d at 395. He defended the section changing the
composition of the park commission as a general law based on a reasonable classification
that included only one member. Because of Audubon Park's status as "a major facility
of state and national importance," id. at 396, he argued the "legislation affecting it is
not local legislation merely because [the park] is located in a single parish." Id. To the
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The Audubon Park statute invalidated in Treen was only the most
recent in a series of state laws pertaining to the park." The first statute,
Act 84 of 1870,7 established a park for New Orleans under the control
of a board of commissioners appointed by the governor; it also required
New Orleans to levy and collect a tax for the use of the commissioners.
Subsequent statutes abolished the original board of commissioners and
transferred authority over the park to the New Orleans City Council,88
but a later statute transferred the authority to a new entity, the Audubon
Park Association.88 In more modern times, the terms of the 1914
amendment" have governed the operation of the park. It vested control
over the park in an Audubon Park Commission appointed by the mayor
of New Orleans9' and directed the city to fund the commission through
the sale of bonds. 92
In 1982, the legislature acted to restructure the control and financing
of the park. The new statute made two general changes. First, it replaced
the old Audubon Park Commission with a new "state agency" whose
members were to be drawn from the New Orleans metropolitan area rather
than exclusively from the city of New Orleans.93 Second, it required the
contrary, "the subject of the act in question [was] a matter of legitimate state concern
rightfully amenable to regulation by the state within its police power." Id. Justice Dennis
also contended that the Audubon Park legislation was not local "simply because the City
of New Orleans is the only local government required to subsidize the facility's operations."
Id. As a result of the park's location within the city's boundaries, the city "derives far
more tax revenues generated by the facility than any other local government." Id. Therefore,
the "classification or limitation" of the "revenue contribution requirement to this local
tax district" was a reasonable one, and the statute was a general, rather than a local, law.
86. For a more detailed description of the various amending statutes, see Treen, 431
So. 2d at 392-93.
87. Act 84 of 1870 amended and reenacted Act 83 of 1871.
88. 1877 La. Acts, No. 87; see also 1884 La. Acts, No. 103. Act 87 of 1877 also repealed
the special tax that the city had been required to levy to support the park.
89. 1896 La. Acts, No. 130. This act also directed the city to use city funds to provide
financing for the association.
90. 1914 La. Acts, No. 191.
91. Id. §§ 1-3. The 1914 statute established a 24-member commission, all of whom
were appointed with the advice and consent of the city council.
92. Id. §§ 7-8. The statute also directed the city to pay the interest and principal of
the bonds by annual appropriations for the "reserve fund" of the city budget.
93. LA. R.S. 56:1761(B) (Supp. 1983), as added by 1982 La. Acts, No. 352, § 2. City
of New Orleans v. Treen gave the following summary of the commission as reorganized
by the 1982 legislation:
The new commission is composed of 24 members. The president of Friends of
the Zoo is to be a member of the commission. The remaining 23 members are
to be appointed by the Governor, 11 of whom are to be members of Friends
of the Zoo. Twelve members of the commission are to be residents of New Orleans
and 11 are to be residents from the five surrounding parishes.
431 So. 2d at 393.
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New Orleans City Council to appropriate "not more than $700,000" an-
nually for the operating expenses of the new park commission."
Statutes dealing with Audubon Park had been regularly publicized
as local laws" since the origination of the publication requirement in the
Louisiana Constitution of 1879,96 but the sponsors of the 1982 legislation
chose not to advertise their bill. The state argued that the publication
requirements of article III, section 13 were inapplicable; in its view, the
statute was a general law because the statutory classifications it created
were reasonable. Limiting the reorganization provisions to Audubon Park
was reasonable, the state urged, because the park property contains the
only significant zoo in the state; likewise, the state argued that imposing
the funding obligation only on New Orleans was reasonable because the
city receives- special benefits from the park.9 7
The supreme court disagreed, ruling that the statute was a local act
and holding the act unconstitutional. The basis for the court's ruling was
its conclusion that the act had "an immediate and significant impact only
on the people of New Orleans," 98 even though "surrounding parishes .
• .derive[d] substantial benefits from the park and [were] represented
on the commission." 99 The court specifically mentioned two ways in which
the statute had a special impact on New Orleans: (1) the funding require-
ment applied only to the city, and (2) the statute authorized the new park
commission to assume control over two pieces of park property that were
owned by the city. 00 Because of these impacts, the court found that the
statute did "not operate equally and uniformly upon all persons brought
within the relations and circumstances for which it provides, that is, upon
94. LA. R.S. 56:1766(A), as added by 1982 La. Acts, No. 352, § 2. Because the court
held the statute unconstitutional, it did not discuss whether Act 352 of 1982 required the
city to make some minimum payment.
95. See 1914 La. Acts, No. 191; 1896 La. Acts, No. 130; 1884 La. Acts, No. 103;
see also 1979 La. Acts, No. 55 (bill authorizing New Orleans to issue bonds for Audubon
Park advertised as a local law). The supreme court summarized the prior Audubon Park
statutes as follows:
Ever since control of Audubon Park was given to the City Council of New Orleans
in 1877, each legislative act giving control of the park to another agency, with
the exception of Act 352, has been published prior to its introduction in accord-
ance with the constitutional requirement for local and special legislation.
431 So. 2d at 393 (footnote omitted).
96. LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 48. Earlier constitutions had banned certain types of local
laws, but they did not include the publication requirement. See LA. CONST. of 1886, art.
113 (no special laws relating to adoption, emancipation, change of names, or divorce); LA.
CON ST. of 1864, art. 117 (same); cf. LA. CoNsT. of 1852, art. 114 (no legislative divorces);
LA. CONST. of 1845, art. 117 (same).
97. 431 So. 2d at 394.
98. Id. at 395.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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all persons and parishes deriving benefits from the park and represented
on its commission .... [and that] its limitation to New Orleans [was]
not based on a reasonable classification."'' 0
At least three concerns seem to underlie the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Treen. First, Treen reflects the disfavor with which the pres-
ent court views laws that single out specifically named localities for special
burdens. Nearly all of the decisions since the passage of the 1974 con-
stitution have viewed with suspicion statutes that specify the localities to
which they apply,' 2 and'Treen is consistent with the trend of those deci-
sions. Second, by treating the Audubon Park statute as a local act, the
court followed a century of legislative practice.' 3 Although not
conclusive,'14 such a uniform legislative practice offers persuasive prece-
dent as to the nature of the law under consideration, particularly when
the provision under review has been reenacted in successive constitutions.
Third, treating the Audubon Park statute as a local act enabled the court
to avoid other troublesome constitutional questions that challenged the
substance of the statute.'0
In effect, precedent combined with legislative practice and prudence
to encourage the court to declare the Audubon Park statute a local act.
The. Treen decision cannot, however, be generalized into a judicial
preference for local governments in contests with the state. As the following
group of cases makes clear, the court has tended to favor the state in
such conflicts when the state action involves statutes of general applicabil-
ity.
Status of Local Governments
Prior to the adoption of the 1974 constitution, Louisiana courts used
the "state creature" concept to define the status of local governments
vis a vis the state.'° Two important consequences followed from this ap-
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., State v. Slay, 370 So. 2d 508 (La. 1979); State ex rel. State Banking
Dep't v. Acadiana Bank & Trust Co., 360 So. 2d 846 (La. 1978); State v. LaBauve, 359
So. 2d 181 (La. 1978). But see Davenport v. Hardy, 349 So. 2d 858 (La. 1977).
103. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
104. Knapp v. Jefferson-Plaquemines Drainage Dist., 224 La. 104, 114, 68 So. 2d 774,
777 (1953); accord City of New Orleans v. Treen, 421 So. 2d 282, 286 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 431 So. 2d 390 (La. 1983).
105. For example, the court of appeals had ruled that section 3(E)(2) of Act 352 of
1982, which continued existing revenue allocations and dedications, was "wholly inconsis-
tent with the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans as provided for by Art.
VI of the Louisiana Constitution." City of New Orleans v. Treen, 421 So. 2d 282, 287
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 431 So. 2d 390 (La. 1983); see generally
LA. CO ST. art. VI, §§ 4, 6. For a discussion of recent decisions analyzing the extent to
which the 1974 constitution protects local governments with home rule charters from state
interference in their affairs, see infra notes 106-78 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Pyle v. City of Shreveport, 215 La. 257, 263, 40 So. 2d 235, 238 (1949);
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proach: (1) local governments had only those powers expressly or implicitly
conferred on them by statute, and (2) local ordinances that were inconsis-
tent with state law were invalid.
Although the two issues are analytically distinguishable, early cases
tended to merge them inasmuch as a conclusion that a particular local
action was inconsistent with state law would inevitably mean that no state
law authorized the local action.' The distinction between authority to
act and immunity from state control became important, however, as in-
dividual local governments received constitutional authority to adopt home
rule charters. These charters gave local governments authority to act in
a variety of situations without specific legislative permission and also gave
them a much more limited immunity from state control.
Perhaps the most important of "home rule" amendments to the Loui-
siana Constitution of 1921 was a 1946 amendment authorizing the city
of Baton Rouge and the parish of East Baton Rouge to adopt a home
rule charter providing for a consolidated plan of government for the city
and parish.' The amendment provided that the charter could allow the
new city-parish government to exercise any powers necessary for the
management of its affairs, and it protected the city-parish government
from state interference with "structure, organization, and [the] particular
distribution or redistribution of [its] powers and functions among the
several units of local government within the Parish."'0 9 A 1960 decision
of the first circuit, La Fleur v. City of Baton Rouge,"0 ruled that the
pay of firefighters fell within this "structure and organization" language;
as a result, the court held that the provisions of a state statute governing
pay of firefighters did not apply to the city-parish government. Nine years
later, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited La Fleur approvingly in Letellier
v. Jefferson Parish Police Jury."' Letellier held that similar "structure
and organization" language in the authorization allowing Jefferson Parish
to adopt a home rule charter"' allowed the parish to decline to follow
the state statute establishing a civil service system for parochial firefighters.
The 1974 constitution significantly altered the traditional theory con-
cerning the status of local governments vis a vis the state. For one thing,
Union Sulphur Co. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 153 La. 857, 861, 96 So. 787, 788 (1923); B.W.S.
Corp. v. Evangeline Parish Police Jury, 293 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). But see
LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIV, § 40 (d) (1952) (granting municipalities authority "to adopt
and enforce local police, sanitary, and similar regulations, and to do and perform all other
acts pertaining to its local affairs, property and government which are necessary and proper
in the legitimate exercise of [their] corporate powers and municipal functions").
107. E.g., City of Minden v. David Bros. Drug Co., 195 La. 791, 197 So. 505 (1940).
108. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIV, § 3(a) (1946).
109. Id. § 3(a)(2).
110. 124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
111. 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969).
112. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. XIV, § 3(c) (1956).
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article VI has, as a practical matter, largely eliminated the need for local
governments to seek legislative authorization to act. Section 4 confirms
the powers conferred on local governments by prior home rule charters," 3
and section 5 authorizes both parishes and municipalities to adopt new
home rule charters that permit the exercise of any power necessary to
manage local affairs so long as the power is not inconsistent with the
constitution or denied by general law."" Furthermore, section 7 permits
home rule governments without home rule charters to exercise similar
powers if the local electorate votes, in a referendum election, to permit
the local government to exercise the power." '
Article VI of the 1974 constitution also contains two provisions that
immunize local governments from state interference in their affairs. Using
language drawn from the constitutional amendments construed in La Fleur
and Letellier,"'6 section 6 provides a special protection for governments
with home rule charters: it prohibits the legislature from enacting any
113. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. Section 4 provides as follows:
Every home rule charter or plan of government existing or adopted when this
constitution is adopted shall remain in effect and may be amended, modified,
or repealed as provided therein. Except as inconsistent with this constitution, each
local governmental subdivision which has adopted such a home rule charter or
plan of government shall retain the powers, functions, and duties in effect when
this constitution is adopted. If its charter permits, each of them also shall have
the right to powers and functions granted to other local governmental subdivisions.
114. Id. art. VI, § 5(e). Section 5(e) provides as follows:
A home rule charter adopted under this Section shall provide the structure and
organization, powers, and functions of the government of the local governmental
subdivision, which may include the exercise of any power and performance of
any function necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of its affairs,
not denied by general law or inconsistent with this constitution.
115. Id. art. VI, § 7(e). Section 7(e) provides as follows:
Subject to and not inconsistent with this constitution, the governing authority
of a local governmental subdivision which has no home rule charter or plan of
government may exercise any power and perform any function necessary, requisite,
or proper for the management of its affairs, not denied by its charter or by general
law, if a majority of the electors voting in an election held for that purpose vote
in favor of the proposition that the governing authority may exercise such general
powers. Otherwise, the local governmental subdivision shall have the powers
authorized by this constitution or by law.
Until a government that lacks a home rule charter holds an election, it can exercise only
those powers granted by state law or the constitution. See Rollins Environmental Servs.
v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127, 1134-35 (La. 1979) (Tate, J., concurring);
Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Local Government Law, 41 LA. L. REV.
483, 485-88 (1981).
116. See Kean, A Selective Analysis of the Louisiana Constitution-1974-Local Govern-
ment and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REV. 63, 69 (1975) (explanation of Gordon Kean, a
delegate to the constitutional convention and a member of the committee on municipal and
parochial affairs); see also 12 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1973: COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 249 (1977) (letter from Alvin Eason to Walter Lanier, Jr.)
[hereinafter cited as RECORDS].
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law "the effect of which changes or affects the structure and organiza-
tion or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and
functions" of any local government operating under a home rule charter.
In addition, section 14 provides additional protection for all local govern-
ments. It normally forbids laws "requiring increased expenditures for
wages, hours, working conditions, pension and retirement benefits, vaca-
tion, or sick leave benefits" of local government employees from
"becom[ing] effective until approved by ordinance enacted by the govern-
ing authority of the affected political subdivision or until the legislature
appropriates funds."
The constitution qualifies this local immunity from state interference
in two important respects. First, the protection that section 14 provides
with respect to laws requiring increased expenditures for employee-related
expenses contains a major exception: it does not apply to laws "providing
for civil service, minimum wages, working conditions, and retirement
benefits for firemen and municipal policemen." Second, article VI, sec-
tion 9(B) declares that "[n]otwithstanding any provisions of [article VI],
the police power of the state shall never be abridged."
A central ambiguity of article VI concerns whether local governments
with home rule charters must comply with state statutes regulating the
pay and working hours of police officers and firefighters. The "structure
and organization" language of section 6 suggests that the Constitutional
convention meant to extend the La Fleur and Letellier holdings, which
provided protection from state statutes concerning firefighters, to all local
governments. Two other provisions in the text of article VI, however,
allow arguments that would limit the reach of this language: (1) the
declaration in section 9 that none of the provisions in article VI permit
the abridgement of the state's police power, and (2) the exception that
section 14 makes for the pay-related benefits of police officers and
firefighters.
The argument based on section 9's prohibition of any abridgement
of the police power is relatively straightforward. Since protection of the
public safety, the traditional lodestone of the police power," 7 provides
the basis for state control over the pay of local firefighters and police
officers," 8 neither section 6 nor any other provision can limit state con-
trol in this area.
117. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (La. 1978); Hi-Lo
Oil Co. v. City of Crowley, 274 So. 2d 757, 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
118. See, e.g., 7 RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 28 1973, supra note 116,
at 1480-92. Delegate Stinson argued that "[i]t's a statewide protection and security that
the citizens of Louisiana are entitled to." 7 id. at 1483. Delegate De Blieux declared that
"the legislature ought to have something to say about how [fire and police departments]
operate so that we can be sure that the lives and the property of all of our citizens are
protected as much as possible." 7 id. at 1485. Delegate Roy urged that "when you deal
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The issue of whether section 14 qualifies the protection from state
control granted by section 6 turns on the interpretation of the police and
fire exception found in section 14. If the exception is viewed (as its literal
wording suggests) as simply a limit on the specific protection that section
14 extends to all local governments, 19 it has no impact on the additional
protection that section 6 grants to local governments with home rule
charters. On the other hand, if the exception is construed as the conven-
tion's affirmative determination that the legislature should control the pay-
related benefits of police officers and firefighters, all local governments-
whether or not they have home rule charters-are subject to state law
governing these matters.
In recent years, both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the courts
of appeal have managed to avoid decisions that directly addressed the
questions of whether section 9 or section 14 qualify the protection af-
forded by section 6.120 However, a series of decisions during the last year
has moved the supreme court closer to a definitive resolution of the issues.
A second circuit decision expressly held that, despite section 6, local
governments with home rule charters still must comply with state statutes
relating to overtime pay for police officers,' 2 ' and dicta in two supreme
court decisions provided support for the second circuit's decision by em-
phasizing the plenary nature of the state's power to control the pay-related
benefits of police officers and firefighters.'2 "
The first case that attempted to raise the question of whether section
6 precluded state control over the pay of firefighters employed by local
governments with home rule charters was Spillman v. City of Baton
Rouge.'23 However, the first circuit managed to duck the issue by deciding
with something on a statewide basis like for fire protection and police protection, all citizens
of this state, all over [the] state are entitled to the protection." 7 Id. at 1489. Cf. Littel
v. City of Peoria, 374 Ill. 344, 347, 29 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1940) (Policemen's Minimum
Wage Act is sustained as action fulfilling the state's duty "to preserve peace and order
and [to] protect life, liberty and property"); Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wisc.
58, 76, 267 N.W. 25, 32 (1936) (state statute governing wages of police officers was an
exercise of state power to enact measures for "the preservation of order, the enforcement
of law, the protection of life and property, and the suppression of crime").
119. Two law review commentators have advocated this interpretation. Kean, supra note
116, at 69-70; Comment, Exclusive Powers of Louisiana Home Rule Municipalities and
Parishes, 23 Loy. L. REV. 961, 981 (1977).
120. See, e.g., West v. Allen, 382 So. 2d 924 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, supra
note 115, at 490-93; Bradford v. City ,of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1975); Tull v.
City of Baton Rouge, 385 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 392 So. 2d 663
(La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Local Govern-
ment Law, 42 LA. L. REV. 564, 575-79 (1982).
121. Ruby v. City of Shreveport, 427 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
433 So. 2d 154 (La. 1983).
122. City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1983); New Orleans Firefighters
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 402 (La. 1982).
123. 417 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), remanded for reconsideration, 430 So.
2d 92 (La. 1983).
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the case on the basis of article XIV, section 26 of the 1974 constitution,
a ground that was not argued by the parties.' 24 Section 26 declares that
the 1974 constitution is not retroactive and does "not create any right
or liability which did not exist under the Constitution of 1921 based upon
actions or matters occurring prior to the effective date of this constitu-
tion." Since La Fleur excluded Baton Rouge from the state statute under
the 1921 constitution, and the current statutes relating to police benefits
were passed prior to the effective date of the 1974 constitution, the court
concluded that section 26 forbade requiring Baton Rouge to comply with
the statutes.' 25
Shortly after the first circuit's Spillman decision, New Orleans
Firefighters Association v. Civil Service Commission'26 forced the Loui-
siana Supreme Court to consider the nature of section 14's exception
relating to police officers and firefighters. Specifically, New Orleans
Firefighters required the court to decide whether the New Orleans Civil
Service Commission had to follow a state statute'27 requiring it to include
supplemental compensation paid by the state 2 ' in computing the over-
time pay of city firefighters, and the court followed a four-step analysis
to its conclusion that the statute did bind the commission.
The first step in the court's analysis was its affirmation of the state
legislature's "plenary power to enact laws providing for the minimum
wages and working conditions of firemen."' 29 The premise for this affir-
mation was the constitutional provision vesting the state's legislative power
in the legislature. 3 ' As a result of this unconditional delegation of
legislative power, the court concluded that the legislature "may enact any
124. Id. at 1216 (Lanier, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
125. Id. (opinion of the court).
126. 422 So. 2d 402 (La. 1982). Chief Justice Dixon submitted a dissenting opinion that
Justice Blanche joined. In his view, the state supplemental pay for firefighters was "extra
compensation" rather than "minimum wages." Therefore, he argued, it did not fall within
the scope of the fire and police exemption to section 14's ban on laws requiring increased
expenditures for wages of local government employees. Id. at 415.
Justice Marcus also dissented. Because he also considered the supplemental pay statute
distinct from the constitutionally reserved authority to impose minimum wages, he con-
cluded that "requiring the City to include state supplemental pay to the basis for com-
puting overtime pay," id. at 416, violated article VI, section 14 "because the state [had]
not appropriated funds to cover this expenditure." Id.
127. LA. R.S. 33:1994 (1966); Williams v. City of West Monroe, 403 So. 2d 842 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1981).
128. LA. R.S. 33:2002 (Supp. 1983) (firefighters who have been regularly employed by
a municipality, parish, or fire protection district for at least three months are paid a state
supplement of no less than $150 per month).
129. 422 So. 2d at 406.
130. LA. CoNsT. art. Il, § 1; see generally Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533,
533-35 (1976).
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legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit," 3 ' including laws
regulating the minimum wages and working conditions of firefighters.
After clarifying the plenary character of the legislature's power, the
court turned to the second step of its analysis: determining whether "some
particular constitutional provision . . . limits the power of the legislature
to enact the statute."' 32 Because the commission, not the city council,
sets the pay rates of New Orleans firefighters,' the case did not raise
the question of whether article III, section 6'11 limited the legislature's
power. The court did, however, consider and reject two other arguments.
First, it dismissed the suggestion that article VI, section 14 somehow limited
the legislature's powers. On the contrary, New Orleans Firefighters de-
scribed the fire and police exception of section 14'1 5 as "not only an ex-
ception to the home-rule financial automony created 'by the remainder
of the section, but also . . . a positive reaffirmance of the plenary power
of the legislature to guarantee adequate fire and police protection for all
citizens of Louisiana."' 36 Second, the court also rejected the argument
that the commission's constitutional power to adopt a uniform pay plan
for city employees' limited the legislature's power to enact laws prescrib-
ing minimum wages and working conditions for firefighters. According
to the majority, the commission has historically lacked any "political
policy-forming functions or powers" because its primary functions are
the "quasi-judicial" responsibilities of guaranteeing merit selection of city
employees and preventing arbitrary or discriminatory dismissals.' By con-
trast, determining the minimum wage level of a fireman or municipal
policeman was a "policy question . . . outside the ambit of [the commis-
sion's] quasi-judicial function[s],"''3  and the commission was bound to
accept the legislature's judgment on such issues.
131. 422 So. 2d at 406.
132. Id.
133. LA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 10(A).
134. Id. art. VI, § 6; see supra, notes 108-11, 116 and accompanying text.
135. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 14; see supra text accompanying notes 116, 119.
136. 422 So. 2d at 409 (emphasis added). "Since the constitution plainly calls for the
legislature to establish statewide rules for the measurement of firemen's wages and working
conditions, we conclude that its power in this regard is exclusive." Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
137. LA. CONST. art. X, § 10(A).
138. 422 So. 2d at 410.
139. Id. at 411. The court reiterated its position in unmistakable terms:
Ultimately, the question of the least amount a fireman should be paid in the
State of Louisiana to assure adequate protection in all communities is a matter
of public policy within the legislative prerogative of the Legislature; and the ques-
tion of what plan should be adopted setting actual salaries of public employees
to insure selection, promotion, and treatment of employees on the basis of merit,
free from political influence, is a quasi-judicial function within the prerogative
of the City Civil Service Commission.
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The third step of the analysis in New Orleans Firefighters was to deter-
mine if the law requiring supplemental pay to be included in computation
of overtime pay fell within the legislature's power to enact laws providing
for minimum wages and working conditions of firefighters. The court con-
cluded that the supplemental salary law did fall within the scope of-the
legislature's power because it should "be read in pari materia with the
firemen's minimum wage law."' 0 When so read, it was part of a statutory
scheme whose "principal elements . . . closely resemble[d]""' those of
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act,' 2 "the outstanding example of
a minimum wage and working condition law."'4 3 Therefore, it was "by
all intents and purposes a law providing minimum wages and working
conditions for firemen." ''
Finally, the court had to decide the impact of a previous decision' 4
holding that the firemen's minimum wage law could not constitutionally
be applied to New Orleans. After dismissing the prior decision as involv-
ing "a different issue under a different constitution,"'' 46 the court decided
thai re-enactment of the statute was not required to make the state law
applicable to New Orleans after the adoption of the 1974 constitution.
Since the law had always been one "competent for the lawmakers to
pass,' 411 7 the 1974 constitution's elimination of the "obstacle" to its ap-
plication in the city operated to give it "the effect within the city which
it had always had throughout the state."' '14
Just three months after New Orleans Firefighters was rendered, the
court had to address still another aspect of the state's ability to impose
financial obligations on local governments. The issue in City of New
Orleans v. State' 9 was the constitutionality of various statutes requiring
140. Id. at 413.
141. Id. at 412.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
143. 422 So. 2d at 412.
144. Id. at 411.
145. Barnette v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129 (1974). The court also distinguished Louisiana
Civil Serv. League v. Forbes, 258 La. 390, 246 So. 2d 800 (1971), which voided a state
statute granting state troopers a pay raise, on two grounds: (1) The decision did "not resolve
the question of whether the Legislature's plenary power to establish minimum wage laws
setting a floor under wages, as opposed to the power to actually set each employee's salary,
had been ceded to the Civil Service Commission," New Orleans Firefighters, 422 So. 2d
at 413-14, (2) Article VI, section 14 of the 1974 constitution "expressly reserves to the
Legislature the plenary power to enact minimum wage and working condition standards
for firemen and municipal policemen." 422 So. 2d at 414.
146. 422 So. 2d at 414.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 426 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1983). Justice Dennis concurred and argued that article VI,
section 6 did not apply because the challenged statutes were not laws affecting "the struc-
ture and organization or the particular distribution or redistribution of the powers and func-
tions," LA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, of the city's government. In his view, these laws required
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the city to pay salaries and other expenditures of various state officers '
who served within the city's boundaries.' 51 The court upheld the state
legislation.
The city contended that the state statutes interfered with its "struc-
ture and organization" in violation of article VI, section 6.1' 2 In rejecting
this position, the court emphasized that the protection afforded by sec-
tion 6 was qualified by section 9's preservation of the state's police power
"notwithstanding any provision of . . . Article [VI]."'" According to
the majority, the net effect of the two provisions was that "general legisla-
"the local government to subsidize functions of state government such as the administra-
tion of justice, law enforcement, assessment of taxes and voter registration." 426 So. 2d
at 1322. Since the statutes did "not interfere with the internal management of local govern-
ment or with the compensation of its employees," id., and since their subjects were "mat-
ters of statewide concern rightfully amenable to regulation by the state within its police
power," id., section 6 did not restrict the state's power to pass them.
Justice Lemmon dissented without opinion. Justice Calogero also submitted a dissenting
opinion arguing that the statutes violated article VI, section 6. Since they obligated the
city "to subsidize state functions instead of funding municipal services," id. at 1323, the
statutes altered the city's "structure and organization" by diverting funds from local municipal
needs to meet these functions and dictates. Because they interfered "with the City's fiscal
affairs, a matter at the very heart of the structure and organization of the City," id., he
argued that the statutes were unconstitutional under section 6.
150. Persons who occupy offices created by the constitution or state law are state, not
local, officers, even if they serve within the boundaries of a single locality. See, e.g., Hyrhor-
chuk v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 497, 501-02 (La. 1980) (constable of a ward in Calcasieu Parish);
Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (La. 1980) (parish coroner); Foster v. Hampton,
352 So. 2d 197, 201 (La. 1977) (deputy sheriff); Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d
1304, 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (clerk of city court).
151. For a listing of the statutes involved, see 426 So. 2d at 1319. The court gave the
following summary of the statutes involved:
The acts . . . require the City to pay various sums, including salaries of: the
messengers of the Criminal District Court; the coroner and his employees; the
clerks and deputy clerks of the Criminal District Court; jury commissioners and
secretary to the Board of Jury Commissioners of Criminal District Court; the
clerk and other personnel of Juvenile Court; the Criminal Sheriff, deputies,
assistants and clerks; the District Attorney, assistant district attorneys, clerks,
stenographers, special officers and other expenses of that office. Additionally,
the City must pay: additional compensation to each crier of Civil District Court;
part of the salaries of permanent employees of the Registrar of Voters; a sum
for salaries and other expenses of the Board of Assessors; and $350,000 annually
to the City Park Improvement Association. The City is also required to provide
quarters for the Orleans Parish juvenile court and the Criminal District Court.
Id. at 1320.
152. The trial court had also held that three of the statutes violated article XIV, section
22 of the 1921 constitution, which granted New Orleans a home rule charter. The supreme
court reversed this holding for two reasons: "(1) the New Orleans home rule charter itself
was not a part of the 1921 Constitution; and (2) home rule [as established in the section
granting New Orleans a home rule charter was] subject to other constitutional limitations." Id.
153. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(B); see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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tion enacted under the State's police power"' 5 4 could limit the "autonomy
of local governmental subdivisions with home rule charters."'
5 5
The court next considered whether the state statutes violated section
14, which limits the legislature's power to require "increased expenditures
for wages, hours, working conditions, pension and retirement benefits,
vacation, or sick leave benefits of [local government] employees." Although
City of New Orleans did not directly address the question of whether
section 14 limited section 6,156 the majority indicated that section 14 did
have that effect by beginning its discussion with the assertion that section
14 provided the constitution's "only restriction on the State's power to
enact legislation requiring the expenditure of funds by local
[governments].' 5 " Having thus framed the issue, the court held that,
because section 14 applied only to employees of local governments, it did
not protect the city with respect to the salary payments compelled by the
statutes. Since the "salaries involved . . . [were] being paid to State
employees and not to City employees,"' 58 section 14 did not apply, and
the statutes were therefore constitutional as "valid exercise[s] of the State's
police power.' 1 59
The second circuit's opinion in Ruby v. City of Shreveport'60
represented the final attempt of the 1982-1983 term to explain the scope
of local immunity from state interference with respect to matters involv-
ing the pay of local employees. Ruby required the court of appeals to
decide the constitutional issues that the prior decisions had skirted-
specifically, whether the "structure and organization" language of sec-
tion 6 precluded requiring Shreveport'' to comply with the state statute'
6 2
mandating overtime pay for police officers who worked more than forty
hours per week.
Relying on the supreme court's dicta in New Orleans Firefighters 3
154. 426 So. 2d at 1321.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
157. 426 So. 2d at 1321 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 427 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 154 (La. 1983).
161. An earlier decision had held that the 1921 constitution did not provide Shreveport
any protection from general state laws interfering with its affairs. See Bradford v. City
of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (1974).
162. LA. R.S. 33:2213 (Supp. 1983). This statute is virtually identical to the firefighters
statute involved in Spillman. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. In the past,
Louisiana's courts have used the police statute as a guide to the proper interpretation of
the firefighters statute. See, e.g., Williams v. City of West Monroe, 403 So. 2d 842 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1981).
163. See 427 So. 2d at 1269-70 (quoting New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 402, 406-13 (La. 1982)).
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and City of New Orleans,' the second circuit held that even local govern-
ments with home rule charters had to comply with the state statutes. Ac-
cording to the court of appeals, these decisions required that the police
and fire exception of section 14 be interpreted as "an express reservation
to the state of its plenary and/or police power to legislate minimum wages,
working conditions and retirement benefits for municipal policemen." I'6
Moreover, the decisions also compelled the conclusion that this plenary
power was applicable to local governments with home rule charters, "not-
withstanding the provisions of Sections 5 and 6." 166 Having thus established
the controlling principles, the Ruby court had little difficulty in applying
them to the case before it. Since the statute prescribing overtime for police
officers was an exercise of the state's plenary power, the city had to com-
ply with it.167
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed
the problem of the potential conflicts between section 6 and sections 9
and 14, the dicta quoted above as well as the court's recent summary
decisions suggest that Ruby was correctly decided. Just a month after the
Ruby opinion was rendered, the supreme court remanded Spillman to the
first circuit for reconsideration in light of New Orleans Firefighters.'"
Even more recently, the court denied without opinion Shreveport's writ
application in Ruby. 69
One cannot, however, regard the question of the scope of section 6
as completely resolved without an express supreme court holding, and the
importance of the issue to local governments makes it likely that they
will continue to press it to a definitive conclusion.'70 Moreover, one can
164. See 427 So. 2d at 1270-71 (quoting City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318,
1321 (La. 1983)).
165. Id. at 1271.
166. Id.
167. The court of appeals described the city ordinance prescribing a different rule for
overtime as "inconsistent with the constitution as well as being an ultra vires act." Id.
at 1271 & n.3 (citing Charles v. Town of Jeanerette, 234 So. 2d 794 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970)).
168. 430 So. 2d 92 (La. 1983). Presumably, the basis for the remand was the New Orleans
Firefighters holding that the legislature did not have to repass a statute to make it ap-
plicable to the city when the 1974 constitution eliminated the city's prior immunity from
complying with the state statute. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
169. 433 So. 2d 154 (La. 1983). Chief Justice Dixon and Justice Marcus dissented from
the refusal to grant writs.
170. The problem of deciding whether the state or local governments should control
the pay and working conditions of police officers and firefighters has arisen in a number
of states. See, e.g., Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr.
465 (1969); State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukee, 231 Ore. 473, 373 P.2d 680 (1962),
and cases cited therein. For a decision applying a judicially created distinction that seems
similar to Louisiana's constitutional language immunizing a local government with a home
rule charter from state interference, see City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement
Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204, aff'd on rehearing, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978)
(Oregon home rule provisions grant local governments significant autonomy with respect
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weave together threads of argument to form the basis for a slight hope
that the court might distinguish New Orleans Firefighters and City of New
Orleans. All of the decisions favoring state control have divided the court.
New Orleans Firefighters involved a four to three division of the court
with Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Blanche and Marcus dissenting. The
Chief Justice and Justice Marcus also dissented from the writ denial in
Ruby. In addition, Justices Lemmon and Calogero dissented in City of
New Orleans, and Justice Dennis, the author of the majority opinion in
New Orleans Firefighters, filed a concurring opinion in City of New
Orleans in which he cited La Fleur and Letellier, the cases holding that
the "structure and organization" language in the 1921 constitution im-
munized Baton Rouge and Jefferson Parish from state control, with ap-
parent approval. 7 ' In short, only Justice Watson subscribed without
qualification to both opinions. Thus, notwithstanding the writ denial in
Ruby, the dicta in the supreme court opinions may not represent the final
word on local immunity.
If a majority of the court wishes to avoid following its recent dicta,
explaining away the New Orleans Firefighters and City of New Orleans
opinions should not be overly difficult. New Orleans Firefighters itself
indicates that the state's "plenary power" over the minimum wages and
working conditions of police officers and firefighters'" can be restricted
by a "particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the
legislature to enact the statute appealed."' 73 Therefore, a holding that sec-
tion 6 restricts the legislature's power to control wages and working con-
ditions of police officers and firefighters could be entirely consistent with
New Orleans Firefighters, if it were premised on a holding that section
6 is a provision that limits the legislature's plenary power as granted by
article III, section 1 and reaffirmed by article VI, section 14. One can
also distinguish the City of New Orleans language describing section 14
as "[tihe only restriction on the State's power to enact legislation requir-
ing the expenditure of funds by local [governments]."' 74 Since that
language was not necessary to the court's holding that neither section 6
nor section 14 forbade state mandates requiring local governments to help
to "structure and procedures of local agencies" but establish state pre-eminence with respect
to "substantive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives").
171. 426 So. 2d at 1322. Statutes requiring local subsidies for salaries and expenses of
state officers "do not interfere with the internal management of local government or with
the compensation of its employees. Compare the statutes at issue to those found unconstitu-
tional in LaFleur v. City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) and
Letellier v. Parish of Jefferson, 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969)." Id.
172. See 422 So. 2d at 406.
173. Id.; see also id. at 409. But cf. id. at 407. The legislature's power to "establish
statewide rules for the measurement of firemen's wages and working conditions . .. is
exclusive." Id. (emphasis added).
174. 426 So. 2d at 1321.
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fund state officers who serve within local boundaries,' it need not con-
trol the separate issue of whether section 6 immunizes local governments
from state requirements regarding the pay of local employees.
The real problem lies, however, not in the court's language but in
the ambiguity of sections 6, 9, and 14 of article VI. As a previous sym-
posium suggested,' 7 6 the search for an irrefutable basis for decisions is
a vain one. The language of section 9 begs the important question-the
scope of the police power-and section 14 is similarly ambiguous. A literal
reading of the text indicates that the police and fire exception of section
14 applies only to the section in which it is contained;'" but the inclusion
of the exception in a section applicable to all local governments, the adop-
tion of the exception after the convention had passed the home rule pro-
tections of section 6, and certain passages in the legislative history 78 sup-
port the argument that section 14 qualifies section 6 with respect to the
pay of police officers and firefighters.
Because neither the text of the constitution nor the legislative history
provides a clearly correct result, the ultimate decision will probably turn
on the court members' individual interpretations of the general balance
of power that article VI strikes between the state and local governments
and on their personal views of the most desirable allocation of that power.
As the foregoing discussion has documented, the 1982-1983 cases hint,
but stop short of holding, that the state will retain ultimate control over
the pay of police officers and firefighters. What local authorities need
now is a definitive resolution of the issue. Even though budgeting for
overtime pay may strain local resources, its impact on effective govern-
ment is less deleterious than the uncertainty that clouds current planning.
The first circuit's decision following the Spillman remand will offer the
supreme court the perfect chance to settle the issue, and the court should
not neglect that opportunity.
TORT LLtABnITY
Legislative Proposals
On the legislative front, the most notable aspect of local tort liability
during the past year was what did not happen. Although the Louisiana
Municipal Association tried to convince the legislature to limit, the tort
liability of local governments, the effort failed. The association supported
two approaches: (1) placing a ceiling on the amount for which a local
175. Id.; id. at 1322 (Dennis, J., concurring).
176. Murchison, supra note 120, at 579.
177. Kean, supra note 116, at 70.
178. See, e.g., 7 RECORDS: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPrTS, Sept. 28, 1973, supra note 116,
at 1483 (statement of Delegate Stinson), 7 id. at 1485 (statement of Delegate DeBlieux);
7 id. at 1489 (statement of Delegate Roy).
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government could be held liable '79 and (2) imposing a notice or construc-
tive notice element in suits based on Civil Code article 2317.80 Although
prominent legislators publicly acknowledged the need to provide relief for
local governments, the legislature adjourned without passing either bill.'8 '
Moreover, recent judicial decisions may have blunted the drive for
legislative relief by applying existing doctrines in a fashion that makes
the liability of local governments somewhat less absolute. The material
below provides an overview of those judicial developments.
Judicial Developments
Article 2317
Decisions of the courts of appeals during 1982-1983 have reaffirmed
that, despite Jones v. City of Baton Rouge,'82 Civil Code article 2317183
does not render a government absolutely liable for all injuries whenever
one can draw a chain of causation from the injury to a "thing" in the
government's control. Essentially, the decisions have continued the trend
of the previous two years"' and have limited governmental liability by
emphasizing that liability attaches only when the thing causing injury
presents an unreasonable risk of harm and by relieving the government
of liability when the court determines that the "legal cause" of the injury
is "victim fault" or the act of a third party rather than the defective thing.
During the past year, three separate decisions in three different cir-
cuits refused to hold governmental defendants liable on the ground that
the thing causing injury was not defective. Although the state was the
defendant in two of these cases, all of them are nonetheless significant
179. La. H.R. 200, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983). One objection to such a statutory ceiling on
damages is the argument that it violates the 1974 constitution's abrogation of governmental
immunity. For a suggestion as to how a statutory scheme might be drafted to avoid this
problem, see Murchison, 1977-1978 Term, supra note 80, at 878-79.
180. La. H.R. 201, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983); cf. La. H.R. 599, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983)
(abolishing article 2317 liability for governments and requiring actual notice of property's
defect as a condition to liability under article 2317).
181. See La. H.R. 200, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983), scheduled but not heard HOUSE COMMIT-
TEE ON Crva LAW AND PROCEDURE, 9TH REG. SESS., AGENDA FOR COMMITTEE HEARING-
MAY 10, 1983, at 1 (Comm. Print 1983); La. H.R. 200, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983), deferred
in committee SENATE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL AND MtmNCAL AFFAIRS, 9TH REG. SEss., MINUTES
OF MEETING-JUNE 9, 1983, at 2 (Comm. Print 1983); La. H.R. 599, 9th Reg. Sess. (1983),
deferred in committee HOUSE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 9TH REG. SEss.,
MNIUTES OF MEETING-MAY 10, 1983, at 3-7 (Comm. Print 1983).
182. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 120, at 588-89.
183. Article 2317 provides in pertinent part: "We are responsible, not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom
we are answerable, or of things which we have in our custody." For a brief summary of
the elements of a cause of action under aritcle 2317, see Murchison, supra note 120, at 588.
184. See generally Murchison, supra note 15, at 483-86; Murchison, supra note 115,
at 490-92.
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for local governments since all governmental defendants are held to the
same standard of reasonableness in determining whether the thing caus-
ing injury is defective. In Williams v. Parish of East Baton Rouge,'8
the driver of an automobile lost control of his vehicle when it struck a
pothole in a parish street; the parish was unaware of the pothole even
though it had a program for checking major streets, like the one on which
the accident occurred, for potholes. In light of this evidence, the first
circuit ruled that the existence of the pothole did not make the street
a defective thing under article 2317 because it did not create an
unreasonable risk of harm. Similarly, in Booth v. Potashnick Construc-
tion Co.,"86 the second circuit held that the state's nonnegligent excava-
tion of a road shoulder in connection with a highway construction pro-
ject did not make the highway a defective thing under article 2317. Em-
phasizing "the obvious necessity of such road construction projects,"'9 7
the court of appeals held that the excavation was not a defect or vice
within the meaning of article 2317 because it did not "create an
unreasonable risk of harm to the public."' 88 The third decision holding
that governmental property was not defective was Cloud v. State."9 In
Cloud, the court concluded that a one-eighth inch variation'90 in the riser
heights of the outside steps to a state hospital building did not make the
steps defective when expert testimony indicated that the steps met "modern
architectural principles and standards."'' According to the court of ap-
peals, the minor "irregularities" that the plaintiff proved "did not rise
to the dimension of presenting an unreasonable risk of harm."'9
In two other cases, local governments did not fare so well. In Jones
v. Sewerage & Water Board,"" the fourth circuit held the sewerage board
liable for injuries that occurred when the plaintiff stepped into an open
drain cleanout on a city sidewalk.' 94 According to the appellate panel,
185. 417 So. 2d 483 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982). Judge Shortess dissented in Williams.
After summarizing the facts at length, he announced his agreement with the following con-
clusion of the trial judge: "[Tihe existence of the pothole and the fact that the pothole
filled with water after a rainstorm made that section of the road unreasonably dangerous
in normal use." Id. at 485 (quoting Williams v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 216,512)
at 1 (19th La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 11, 1981)).
186. 420 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1183 (La. 1983).
187. Id. at 515.
188. Id.
189. 420 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1982).
190. Plaintiff's expert testified that the variation exceeded the three-sixteenths variance
permitted by the Life Safety Code, a building code adopted by the legislature. The court
of appeals rejected this contention on the ground that the record showed that the expert
had erred "either in his measurements or in his arithmetic." Id. at 1264.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 430 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
194. The court of appeals also held New Orleans jointly liable for the defective drain
cover. It gave two reasons for this finding that the city exercised joint custody over the
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the defect in the drain cleanout "was the easy removability of the cover,
which under the circumstances of this case constituted an unreasonable
risk of harm to others."' 95 The court, however, stopped short of holding
that an easily removable cover would always render a drain cleanout defec-
tive. The evidence in Jones showed that neither the drain nor the drain
cleanout had ever been used. Because the governmental defendants failed
to show any "necessity for the existence of this drain cleanout cover.
I [t]he risk of harm created by its easy removability was not justified
in any way."' 96 The other decision holding a local government liable under
article 2317 was Deville v. Calcasieu Gravity Drainage District No. 5.197
In Deville, the plaintiff fell into a manhole when a storm drain cover
gave way when she stepped on it. Although the plaintiff could not point
to a specific defect in the cover, the third circuit nonetheless concluded
that "this accident would not have happened had the storm drain cover
not been defective.""' 8 Relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court's opin-
ions in Marquez v. City Stores Co. "I and Jones v. City of Baton Rouge,2"'
the court of appeals ruled that the accident itself constituted an "unusual
occurrence" and thus furnished the necessary evidence that the thing caus-
ing the injury was defective."0 '
Taken together, the decisions of the past year confirm the recent
trend2"2 towards blurring the distinctions between the standard of care
under article 2317 and the standard of care applicable in negligence ac-
tions based on Civil Code article 2315. They continue to expose local
governments to liability for public works that are unnecessary or that are
poorly designed or maintained, while relieving them of liability from
prudently designed and maintained public improvements that are needed
to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to government. As a result, the best
liability protection for a local government may well be an aggressive safety
program that documents the government's attempts to minimize the risk
of injury from public improvements.
Other decisions of the past year have absolved local governments from
article 2317 liability when the negligent or intentional act of another party
drain cover: (1) the location of the drain "in a sidewalk owned by the City," id. at 1067,
and (2) the city's heavy involvement "in the management of the board especially through
the appointment power of the mayor." Id.
195. Id. at 1065.
196. Id. at 1066 (distinguishing Goodlow v. City of Alexandria, 407 So. 2d 1305 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1981)).
197. 422 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
198. Id. at 634.
199. 371 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979), analyzed in Crawford, The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Torts, 40 LA. L. REv. 564, 567-70 (1980).
200. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980).
201. 422 So. 2d at 633-34.
202. See generally Murchison, supra note 15, at 486.
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interrupts the chain of causation from the injury to the allegedly defec-
tive thing. Furthermore, courts have relieved govermnental defendants from
liability when the act was committed by the victim as well as when it
was committed by a third party.
Although the exact parameters of the "victim fault" defense to arti-
cle 2317 liability remain unclear," 3 the recent cases seem to require that
the danger of injury from the defective thing be apparent to a reasonable
person in the position of the victim. Using this rationale, the first circuit
held that a motorist's election to cross a bridge where the danger of col-
lapse was obvious constituted victim fault, " " and the fourth circuit held
that a postal carrier's decision to use an uneven sidewalk after he was
aware of its defective character barred recovery under article 2317.20, By
contrast, the third circuit ruled in Deville that stepping on the defective
drain cover did not amount to victim fault because "it was not
unreasonable for the plaintiff to forget about the presence of the cover" 06
as she was checking her mail. In effect, the issue seems to turn on ad
hoc determinations as to how obvious the danger would have been to
a reasonable person under the circumstances.
The courts have also shown a willingness to allow the acts of a third
party to break the chair of causation between a defective thing and an
injury. Williams, for example, held that, even assuming that the pothole
created a defective condition in the street, the driver's negligent operation
of his vehicle-not the defective street-constituted "the cause in fact of
this accident. ' 2 7 Similarly, Brown v. Merz2°0 held that the negligence of
the automobile driver was sufficiently independent of the obstruction of
the stop sign on the inferior street that the driver's negligence should be
treated as the sole legal cause of the accident. The exact rule that these
decisions employ remains unclear, but they seem to turn on a case-by-
case evaluation of whether the presence of the defective thing induced
or enhanced the negligence of the third party.
Article 2315
A number of decisions in the past year have also absolved local
governments of liability for traditional negligence claims. The cases that
rejected claims that government property was defective under article 2317
203. Compare Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1113 (1981) with Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981). See generally Deville
v. Calcasieu Parish Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 5, 422 So. 2d 631, 635 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982); Note, A Functional Purpose for Comparing Faults: A Suggestion for Reexamining
"Strict Liability," 41 LA. L. REv. 1374 (1981).
204. Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
205. Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 430 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
206. 422 So. 2d at 635.
207. 417 So. 2d at 484.
208. 429 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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understandably also rejected claims that the government was guilty of
negligence in controlling or maintaining the property. 209 Indeed, a con-
clusion that the property did not present an unreasonable risk of harm
(the standard of care under article 2317) leads almost inexorably to the
conclusion that the government's conduct with respect to the property
was reasonable (the standard of care under article 2315). In addition, other
decisions have relieved governments from liability on the ground that the
government's duty did not include the risk of the injury that the plaintiff
suffered.
Perhaps the most important of the scope of the risk cases was Patin
v. Industrial Enterprises,21 which defined the scope of a local govern-
ment's duty under its building codes. In Patin, the plaintiff's decedent
was a construction worker who was killed when a gutter he was holding
came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire owned by a private
utility company. Patin argued that the local building code obligated the
city-parish to take all measures necessary to protect the public during con-
struction and that the city-parish breached this duty by allowing a metal
building to be constructed in close proximity to live electric wires.
The first circuit rejected this argument on the ground that the city-
parish's duty under the building code2 ' did not extend as far as Patin
claimed. The court acknowledged that, in light of Stewart v. Schmieder,1 2
a building code could obligate a local government to protect the public
during construction. Nevertheless, it concluded that the city-parish had
not breached any such duty in Patin. In the court's view, the purpose
of any duty based on a building code is "to protect from harms inherent
in a flawed or defective building,"2"3 and the "duty does not extend to
risks which are outside the building site and have no teleological connex-
ity therewith." 2 " Since the city-parish fulfilled its duty under the building
code by properly examining the plans and inspecting the building site,
209. E.g., Booth v. Potashnick Constr. Co., 420 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982),
writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1183 (La. 1983); see also Hampton v. Orleans Parish School Bd.,
422 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (school board not liable under article 2315 or
article 2317 for injury that occurred when student was struck by a rock thrown by another
student who had picked the rock up on an unpaved portion of school playground); cf.
Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 430 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (carrier's actions
in walking on uneven sidewalk amounted to contributory negligence barring recovery under
article 2315 and victim fault barring recovery under article 2317).
210. 421 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1982).
211. BATON ROUGE, LA., BUILDING CODE § 103.1 (1982), quoted in Patin, 421 So. 2d
at 364 n. 1. The court initially held that the plaintiff's counsel had failed to take proper
steps to make the building code a part of the record. Id. at 365. Nonetheless, it went on
to reject the argument on the merits.
212. 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 120, at 592-95.
213. 421 So. 2d at 365.
214. Id.
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the appellate court held that it was not liable for injuries occurring as
the result of risks that were outside the scope of its duty.2",
Two other decisions of the fourth circuit also held that a particular
injury fell outside of the scope of any duty the government owed to the
injured party. In Ciko v. City of New Orleans,2"6 the court held that a
police officer's duty to obtain medical assistance for an accident victim
does not include a duty to compel the victim to receive medical treatment
if the officer feels the "victim is incapable of evaluating his need for
assistance." '217 Since any adult has a right to refuse medical treatment,218
the duty owed by the police officer to an accident victim does not extend
"beyond the offer of medical assistance."2 '9 In Allen v. Housing
Authority,22 the fourth circuit adopted a similar approach to the scope
of the housing authority's duties to repair a tenant's door and to provide
a key to the deadlock. The risks encompassed by these duties did not
include, the court ruled, the risk that the plaintiff would fall off the ledge
of the apartment building as she tried to climb in a window after ac-
cidentally locking herself out.22 ' Although the duties breached by the hous-
ing authority were designed to protect the plaintiff, they were "not de-
signed to protect [her] from the type of harm suffered," '222 and, therefore,
the authority was not liable for her injuries.
Viewed as a group, the negligence cases reflect the same trend
manifested in the article 2317 decisions described above. In both cases,
the court seems to return to the traditional tort standard of reasonableness
to establish limits to recent decisions expanding the scope of tort liability
for local governments. If this analysis of the decisional trend is accurate,
it seems likely that apprehensions concerning the catastrophic impact that
recent tort decisions might have on local governments are a bit premature.
Moreover, it suggests223 that local governments can mitigate the impact
through risk management programs which identify those governmental
duties that present significant dangers of harm to the public and which
carefully review current procedures for carrying out those duties.
Workers' Compensation
Since the 1977 decision in Foster v. Hampton,22 ' the Louisiana
215. Id. at 365-66.
216. 427 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
217. Id. at 82.
218. Id. (citing LA. R.S. 40:1299.56 (1977)).
219. 427 So. 2d at 82.
220. 423 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), writ denied, 430 So. 2d 74 (La. 1983).
221. The court also rejected the claim of a co-plaintiff, a friend who also fell while
trying to assist the tenant to climb on the ledge.
222. 423 So. 2d at 1294.
223. See supra text accompanying note 202.
224. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977), analyzed in Murchison, 1977-1978 Term, supra note
80, at 871-77.
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Supreme Court has struggled to decide which governmental entity is liable
for torts committed by state officers who serve within the boundaries of
specific local governments. The court's recent opinions have taken a func-
tional approach, moving from the court's original position that only the
state was liable to a position that the sheriff is liable in his "official
capacity." '225 What these opinions have not done, however, is explain
whether the new principles of tort liability will affect the exclusion of
"an official of the state or a political subdivision thereof" from the
coverage of the workmen's compensation statute.2 ' Recent decisions of
the third circuit, however, suggest that the supreme court will have to
face the issue in the near future.
Cloud v. State, 2" the first of the third circuit decisions, held that
the statutory exclusion precluded an acting coroner22' from receiving com-
pensation benefits from the state. Relying on the definition of "public
officers" in Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:129 and the supreme court's
opinion in Mullins v. State,23 the court of appeals concluded that the
coroner was a "public official and, as such, excepted from coverage against
the state under the workers' compensation laws." '23
A few months later, the third circuit reaffirmed and expanded the
Cloud holding in Broadnax v. Cappel.23 " The issue in Broadnax was
whether a deputy sheriff could collect compensation benefits from the
state. In addition to the general exclusionary language quoted above, a
1981 amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1034(B) expressly
declares that "sheriffs' deputies are . . . appointed public officers and
officials of their respective political subdivisions, the parish law enforce-
225. Compare Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981)
with Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980) and Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d
197 (La. 1977). See generally Murchison, supra note 15, at 477-83.
226. LA. R.S. 23:1034 (Supp. 1983).
227. 420 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 423 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (La. 1982).
228. Although Dr. Cloud was merely an acting coroner when the accident occurred,
the third circuit nonetheless held that he was a "public official" because the elected coroner
had legally authorized him "to act in [the coroner's] stead." Id. at 1261.
229. LA. R.S. 42:1 provides:
As used in this title, the term "public office" means any state, district, parish
or municipal office, elective or appointive, or any position as member on a board
or commission, elective or appointive, when the office or position is established
by the constitution or laws of this state.
"Public officer" is any person holding a public office in this state.
Act 25 of the 1981 Extraordinary Session amended LA. R.S. 23:1034(B) to provide that
except for certain specified exceptions, the term public "officials" includes "all public of-
ficers as defined by R.S. 42:1."
230. 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 120, at 585, 587.
231. 420 So. 2d at 1263.
232. 425 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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ment districts." ' On the basis of this language, the third circuit con-
cluded that a deputy "has no cause of action against the State of Loui-
siana for workmen's compensation.1 234
As a matter of statutory construction, Cloud and Broadnax merit no
criticism. A long line of pre-Foster decisions held that the statutory ex-
clusion in the workers' compensation statute applied to deputy sheriffs.2 35
Moreover, when a 1981 decision of the first circuit 236 interpreted Foster
to render the state liable for compensation benefits, the legislature im-
mediately amended the worker's compensation statute to overrule the deci-
sion and to prevent its extension to other state officials. In light of this
history, the Broadnax conclusion that the legislature "always has intended
that deputy sheriffs are officials exempted from worker's compensation ' 231
is surely correct.
What remains troubling about these decisions concerns an issue that
the parties appear not to have raised in Cloud and Broadnax-the con-
stitutionality of the statutory exclusion of public officials from coverage
under the worker's compensation statute. The abolition of governmental
immunity in the 1974 constitution is not limited to tort actions; it eliminates
immunity "from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or
property. ' 238 The fourth circuit has expressly held that the provision en-
compasses worker's compensation claims.2 39 Moreover, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has applied it to invalidate statutes and judicial rules that
absolve governmental entities of any portion of the liability that private
defendants incur.24 ' In light of these precedents, the logic of a constitu-
tional attack on Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1034 is straightforward:
Since the worker's compensation statute imposes liability upon private
defendants for the actions of their "officials," 2 ' the legislative exclusion
of "public officials" from compensation benefits is unconstitutional as
233. 1981 La. Acts, Extra. Sess., No. 25.
234. 425 So. at 236.
235. See, e.g., Richardson v. Heyd, 278 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Mitchell
v. James, 182 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
236. Phillips v. State, 400 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d
1195 (1981).
237. 425 So. 2d at 236.
238. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(A) (emphasis added).
239. Lewis v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 371 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
240. See Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980); Sequra v. Louisiana
Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978). The Jones and Sequra decisions are
analyzed in Murchison, supra note 120, at 588-91, and Murchison, 1978-1979 Term, supra
note 80, at 712-13.
241. Cf. LA. R.S. 23:1035(A) (Supp. 1983) (provisions of workers' compensation law
are mandatory except that "the bona fide president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer
of a corporation who owns not less than ten percent of the stock therein, or a partner
with respect to a partnership employing him, or a sole proprietor with respect to such sole
proprietorship may by written agreement elect not to be covered").
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a legislative attempt to grant governmental entities 42 a special immunity
in suits "for injury to person."
Equitable considerations combine with the textual rationale described
above to suggest that the Louisiana Supreme Court should declare Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1034 unconstitutional when the issue presents
itself. Inasmuch as the state has determined that the workplace should
be governed by the lesser but more certain benefits of the compensation
statute rather than by traditional tort theories, no equitable rationale
justifies different treatment of public servants (whether they be labeled
officers or employees). Whether the brunt of the inequity falls upon the
governmental entity or the individual public servant will vary in individual
cases,24 3 but the basic inequity will remain: those who work for the public
will be governed by a different legal standard than those who work for
private employers.
242. If the negligence of some other agent of the employer caused the injury and the
employee was not also negligent, the employee would prefer the larger benefits of the tort
claim. Workers who negligently injure themselves while working would prefer the certainty
of workers' compensation benefits.
243. If the court follows its most recent tort decisions, the public official "in his of-
ficial capacity" would be the "governmental entity" liable for the benefits due deputies
and others who work for the public official. See Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Of-
fice, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981); Murchison, supra note 15, at 479-81.
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